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MesajGönderilme zamanı: 10 Mar 2017, 03:25 
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Kayıt: 30 Ağu 2012, 02:08
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Interesting article about the balance of power in Black Sea.

Will Turkey build its A2/AD capabilities to counter Russia’s growing A2/AD assets in the Black Sea and Syria?

While the Chinese A2/AD “bubble” in the South China Sea gives headaches to the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region, further to the north, the newest Russian “bubble” is about to go online against Japan in the disputed Kuril Islands. Meanwhile, on the other end of Eurasia, in Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave, another A2/AD zone challenges NATO’s position in Eastern Europe.

Now, two more Russian “bubbles” in the Black Sea and Syria are threatening Turkey and NATO’s southeastern flank.

Russia’s Black Sea and Syria “bubbles” matter to Turkey for several reasons. They spell an end to the relative naval superiority that Ankara had established in the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean after the Cold War. It also means that Turkey has to redirect resources away from its ambitious buildup of force-projection platforms toward developing strategies and weapons to counter the Russian A2/AD bubbles. While Russian–Turkish relations appear better in recent months, the future is uncertain. If a crisis erupts similar to the November 2015 shoot down of a Russian Su-24 by a Turkish F-16, Ankara would face fearful odds against Moscow.

The Bear builds a new lair in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean

In May 2014, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu announced a $2.43 billion naval buildup program. The plan included the deployment of new land-based air defense systems by 2020 in addition to new surface combatants and submarines to bolster Russia’s Black Sea fleet.

As Moscow implemented the sea component of its new Black Sea strategy, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced in March 2015 that Russia had positioned Bastion mobile coastal defense missile systems (SSC-5 in NATO nomenclature) in Crimea. On August 12, RT reported that the most advanced anti-air defense missile system in Russia’s inventory, the S-400 “Triumph,” had been deployed to the peninsula to augment the formidable air defense capabilities of S-300v4 (SA-23 Gladiator) batteries and PANTSIR S-1 gun-missile systems. The ongoing refurbishment of Soviet-era bunkers and reanimation of early-warning radar stations, in conjunction with the deployment of high-tech electronic-warfare equipment, has transformed Crimea into the epicenter of a nearly impenetrable A2/AD zone in the Black Sea.

The land-based anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and early warning capabilities that are integral components of this A2/AD strategy provides Russia’s small Black Sea fleet with impressive long-range defensive and offensive means. In September, Russian chief of general staff Valery Gerasimov stood on solid ground when he claimed that his country had regained supremacy in the Black Sea, which was lost to Turkey in the late 1990s. In a bid to underline the effectiveness of the sea denial strategy now in place, Gerasimov said that Russia’s “Black Sea Fleet should be able—and it has already demonstrated this capability—to destroy a potential enemy’s amphibious force on the way, starting from the ports of embarkation.” He added that “the Black Sea Fleet has all essential means of reconnaissance capable of identifying targets as far as 500 kilometers away and means of attack.”

About 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) to the south, off the coast of the Syrian port city of Tartus, the scene is virtually the same. The Kuznetsov carrier battle group, notwithstanding its impressive AAW and ASuW capabilities, is placed under the aegis of an impressive array of land-based, long-range Bastion anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, as well as air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM).

Land dominating the sea, defense overcoming offense

The Russians are building land-based A2/AD systems to support their naval fleets for a good reason. Just like the Chinese, Russian strategic planners drew the right conclusions after the Gulf War by adopting A2/AD principles, which bar enemy forces from entering, operating in, or remaining in the region of conflict.

This naval strategy is characterized by missile warfare and coastal defense systems that carry the strengths of a naval fleet without its vulnerabilities, thus playing a prominent role in littoral operations. Indeed, in a tactical engagement in the littorals, numerous land-based ASCM and SAM systems can either reinforce the fleet’s firepower in a cost-effective way or batter the adversary fleet and give the coastal state’s fleet the opportunity to engage the enemy on more favorable terms.

To translate all these facts into a working naval strategy, prominent strategists such as Wayne Hughes and James Holmes argue that an A2/AD strategy implemented through “a fortress fleet” and reinforced with minelayers, submarines, land-based air support, and coupled with land-based ASCMs, SAMs and electronic-warfare systems, represents the most cost-effective and hardest-to-counter method of controlling littorals and nearby seas.

Recent events have proven the merits of A2/AD. In October 2016, a series of ASM attacks against several U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels demonstrated that defending surface combatants—even against outdated missiles—is a very expensive task. The Yemen incident proved that attacked ships could egress without a scratch, but the economic cost of mounting an effective defense could be unbearable for many navies. The stakes are so high that no one can risk cutting corners.

The theory and practice of modern naval warfare shows that a fleet’s capability to control the sea, project force and strike land targets is severely hampered in littoral regions because it requires a large and expensive concentration of force—especially shipborne defensive AAW weaponry. This problem is all the more pressing for a fleet such as that of Turkey, which has home ports and littorals within range of Russia’s new A2/AD zones.

Beyond naval and military affairs, Russian “bubbles” also pose a threat to Turkish trade routes. For a country whose economic well-being depends on foreign trade, Russia’s A2/AD zone in Syria, if left unchecked, could pose a near-existential threat in the future.

Why Turkey should change its naval priorities

Against this Russian challenge, Turkey’s naval strategy is premised on presumptions from an era when its navy held relative supremacy in quantitative and qualitative terms in the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. Turkish naval strategy currently aims to defend the homeland and neutralize threats against its rights and interests in peripheral seas. Accordingly, the Turkish Navy’s primary mission is to establish sea control (although Ankara does not indicate whether that control would be absolute or limited). Secondary and tertiary missions are force projection and striking land from the sea, respectively. Sea denial takes only fourth place.

This perspective has shaped the Turkish Navy’s modernization projects. At present, Turkey’s shopping list envisions an impressive force structure influenced by a Mahanian vision of naval strategy that is geared toward sea control and force projection: the planned development and building of I-class stealth frigates (basically enlarged Ada-class corvettes) armed with sixteen anti-ship missiles (ASM) each, TF-2000 AAW frigates, two planned landing helicopter docks (LHD) based on Spain’s Juan Carlos I class amphibious assault ships (each worth $1 billion and planned to host F-35Bs) and fast combat-support ships.

Turkey, however, must face the grim reality. In the Black Sea, the ongoing and planned deployment of modern, stealthy surface combatants like the Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, modified Buyan M-class corvettes, and the commissioning of the sixth and last Varshavyanka-class (Improved Kilo) diesel electric submarines have tipped the scales in Russia’s favor. Furthermore, while becoming increasingly unpredictable as well as aggressive, Moscow is close to establishing two very powerful A2/AD zones flanking Turkey from the north and south, severely restricting the country’s ability to maneuver at sea and in the air. As such, the Turkish side should reformulate its naval strategy by establishing its own A2/AD capabilities to assert and exercise sea control.

Today, establishing sea control is an expensive and cumbersome undertaking for a navy, especially in narrow and semi-closed seas and littoral regions surrounding Turkey. Unless a sudden breakthrough creating a singularity in anti-missile technologies comes about (such as efficient direct-energy weapons), land-based A2/AD strategies, with their potential for launching saturation attacks, will prevail over ship-based defense.

The good news is that Turkey has made some progress with weapon systems that could be used to establish an A2/AD zone. For some time, Turkey’s defense industries have been working on developing indigenous ASM and ALCM technologies. Under the first category, the ATMACA (“Hawk”) project, in progress since 2009, aims to develop an indigenous ASM with capabilities and range similar to the Harpoon Block II, which is slated for replacement from the Turkish Navy’s surface and submarine platforms.

Regarding ALCM, Turkey’s stand-off munition (SOM), the B-1 model, is said to have a greater range than 180 kilometers (100 nautical miles) and comes equipped with an imaging infrared (IIR), automatic target recognition-capable seeker that enables it to hit moving surface targets. This missile has already been integrated into the Turkish Air Force’s F-4E 2020 Terminator aircraft and F-16 Block 40 aircraft. Also under development are an extended-range variant and a stealthier model specifically designed to fit into the internal bays of F-35s.

These innovations, while impressive, are not enough. Turkey needs to discover the tactical potential of long-range cruise missile technology and translate it into a realistic and cost-effective naval strategy. In this respect, it must invest in and develop coastal missiles with ranges of up to 300 kilometers (about 160 nautical miles), along with the required mobile launchers and target acquisition and tracking systems. In contrast to long-range air and missile defense technologies, Turkey seems to possess the needed technical capability to quickly develop and mass-produce high-precision ASCMs.

Given its geographic position—dominating choke points between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and long coastlines bordering narrow and semi-closed seas—land-based mobile weapons and sensor systems will be a great boost to the Turkish Navy. Establishing a long- and short-range integrated AAW shield is equally important. With such a collection of toys, Turkey could deny its littorals to any adversary and threaten and harass them in the Aegean Sea, the eastern Mediterranean and the southern half of the Black Sea.

A2/AD: The last viable option to fall back on in a chaotic world

Irrespective of Russia’s intentions (or recent signs of a Russian–Turkish rapprochement in Syria), Ankara has other good reasons to invest in A2/AD capabilities.

For one, at a time when Turkey faces rapid technological advances and an uncertain strategic environment, it should opt for a cautious and defensive naval posture. The deep uncertainty that the incoming U.S. administration creates over the future of NATO and the new security situation in Turkey's neighborhood necessitates the creation of an A2/AD bubble sooner rather than later. An A2/AD bubble would allow Turkey to deny the surrounding seas and skies to countries that may act against its national interests.

A robust A2/AD system would also allow Turkey to respond to Donald Trump's criticism during the presidential campaign that NATO allies have to do their part, chip in and not free-ride on U.S. security guarantees and boost their capabilities by increasing their defense budget. Thus, Turkey, with help from its NATO allies, should strive to create its own A2/AD shield and bolster its own defense and that of the West.

To be sure, there is no point in overlooking Turkey’s weakening relations with its NATO partners in the aftermath of the failed coup of July 2016. While both Western criticism of Turkey’s deteriorating democratic standards and Turkish criticism of lack of U.S. and European support for Ankara’s security problems emanating from Iraq and Syria are valid, these concerns should be balanced in relation to greater Western and Turkish strategic interests in the Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the Middle East. In other words, policymakers in Ankara, Washington, Brussels and other Western capitals should ask themselves whether they could afford to “lose” each other at a time when the global scene gets increasingly chaotic and dangerous.

And if Ankara’s relations the West do break down, the A2/AD bubble will be an even more critical asset. For instance, should Turkey’s dormant disputes with Greece in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus resurface, the Hellenic Navy would likely enjoy backing from its sister EU navies. In that case, the Turkish Navy's “power projection” platforms would be of very little use. A land-based defensive A2/AD bubble, on the other hand, would give Turkey a much-needed deterrent shield and keep its sea lanes open, something that expensive, easy-to-kill offensive “power projection” platforms may not achieve.

That means withdrawing from prestigious—but strategically dubious—projects (especially the $2 billion LHD idea) and investing in A2/AD solutions. In an era where even the mighty nuclear aircraft carriers and carrier battle groups are considered increasingly obsolete in “power projection” roles in the littorals and events in its neighborhood are susceptible to radical change, Turkey would be well advised to revise its naval priorities and focus first and foremost on building effective A2/AD zones in its neighboring seas instead of building expensive offensive capabilities with doubtful effectiveness. As Sun Tzu once said, “the skillful warriors first make themselves invincible and await the enemy’s moment of vulnerability.”

Bleda Kurtdarcan is a lecturer at Galatasaray University School of Law in Istanbul, where he teaches public international law. He obtained his Ph.D. from Galatasaray University in 2014 and his LLM from Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne in 2005. He specializes in law of armed conflict, law of the sea, maritime security and the privatization of military services. He is the co-author of the book titled (in Turkish) Wars and Weapons of the Future: An Appraisal of Autonomous Weapon Systems, Lasers, and Computer Network Attacks Under the Law of Armed Conflict.

Barın Kayaoğlu is an assistant professor of world history at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani. He obtained his doctorate in history from the University of Virginia, and he is currently working on his first book, based on his Ph.D. dissertation, on U.S. relations with Turkey and Iran from World War II to the present and pro- and anti-Americanism in the two countries. You can follow him on www.barinkayaoglu.com, Twitter (@barinkayaoglu), and Facebook (Barın Kayaoğlu).


Final Note : This article is taken from nationalinterest.org . I only shared because if this article is deleted from the website it would be unfortunate to loose this precious analyz about Turkey and Russia. For complete article and comments click the link below ;
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/rus ... race-19673

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Memleketimizin ellide biri değil, her tarafı ateşler içinde bırakılsa, biz bu toprakların üzerinde bir tepeye çıkacağız ve oradan savunma ile meşgul olacağız. Gazi Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK (1920. Söylev ve Demeçler II:Sayfa 435)
Eski adım: Blackeyes90


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MesajGönderilme zamanı: 10 Mar 2017, 10:43 
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Kayıt: 05 Ağu 2012, 14:49
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Normally A2/AD strategy is not a new issue as at Canakkale War it was also mentioned by Ataturk to encounter enemy from sea not shore. As generally this writing can be seen mindful but also we should be suspicious about the idea to withdraw from LHD projects and spend the money for coastel defence systems. We should see power projection vessels like LHD or LHA as the part of enlarged A2/ AD strategy. In one hand with SRBM , SSM and short range missiles like UMTAS deploying at our coasts and islands where necessary also with medium and long range air defence missiles which will be supported by land based and air based EW assets will be a powerful answer to Russia and Greece and any threat which may come from sea. In other hand with new LHD warfare groups u may support u AD zone from great ranges. So cancelling projects like LHD can not be a substitution option for our future A2 and AD strategy. Both land , air and sea based systems are all we need.


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